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Estimating slim-majority effects in US state legislatures
with a regression discontinuity design under local
randomization assumptions
Leandro De Magalhães∗
University of Bristol
Regression discontinuity design could be a valuable tool for identifying causal
effects of a given party holding a legislative majority. However, the variable ‘number
of seats’ takes a finite number of values rather than a continuum and, hence, it is not
suited as a running variable. Recent econometric advances suggest the necessary
assumptions and empirical tests that allow us to interpret small intervals around the
cut-off as local randomized experiments. These permit us to bypass the assumption
that the running variable must be continuous. Herein, we implement these tests for
US state legislatures and propose another: whether a slim-majority of one seat had
at least one state-level district result that was itself a close race won by the majority
party.
∗e-mail: leandro.demagalhaes@bristol.ac.uk
2Regression discontinuity design (RDD) has provided political sciencewith an important
tool to identify causal relationships between wining an election and a series of outcomes.
For example, a vast literature has looked at the electoral effects of incumbency (e.g., Lee
2008 and De Magalhães 2015). The conventional analysis of RDDs in these applications
uses vote share as the running variable and relies on the assumption that the running
variable is continuous, i.e., takes a continuum instead of a finite number of values. This
assumption allows us to get arbitrarily close to the cut-off in order to estimate the local
average treatment effect. This assumption does not hold, however, if the running variable
is the number of seats in a legislature, as this variable has clear mass points at the integers.
Thus, the results from the “continuity-based” canonical RDD setup are not applicable, nor
do the standard smoothing methods apply without additional assumptions (Lee and Card
2008 and Kolesár and Rothe 2018).
The use of the number of seats as a running variable is further complicated as there
is no clear mapping between the underlying vote share – the preferred running variable
for an RDD – and the number of seats allocated to each party. Folke 2014 is the first to
discuss this issue in the context of proportional elections and their seat allocation rules. In
our case, the underlying vote share is determined by district-level first-past-the-post races
where the cut-off is known, but also where these district-level races can be aggregated in
various ways and result in the same seat share (Feigenbaum, Fouirnaies, and Hall 2017).
The contribution of this paper is to draw on recent theoretical work regarding the
implementation and interpretation of RDD as a local randomized experiment (Cattaneo,
Frandsen, and Titiunik 2015 and Sekhon and Titiunik 2017) and use that work to study
whether the number (or percentage) of seats can be directly employed as a running
variable for RDDs. We apply the local randomization RDD framework to determine
a specific window for our discrete running variables (the number and the percentage
3of seats). Furthermore, we use the underlying vote share to establish whether there
were enough district-level races that were themselves unpredictable/unanticipated, so
that we may think of the slim-majority versus slim-minority treatment status also as
unpredictable/unanticipated.
Note that the method presented here can be directly applied to proportional elections.
The discrete running variable remains the number of seats and the same window selection
method applies. The equivalent to the test proposed here would be to check how close the
vote share of each party was to the threshold that determines the allocation of an extra seat.
There are two necessary assumptions in order for the number (or percentage) of seats
to be an appropriate running variable in the local randomization RDD framework. First,
for a specific window around the cut-off, the value taken by the running variable (i.e., the
number (or percentage) of seats) is considered to be randomly allocated. Second, we must
impose an exclusion restriction: the size of the majority within this window (e.g., whether
a majority of one or two seats) has no direct effect on the outcome of interest.1 All that
matters for the outcome is assignment of majority status, i.e., treatment. We see this is as a
justifiable assumption as the posts of House Speaker and Senate President are assigned as
soon as there is a one-seat majority.2 A few more seats do not increase formal power over
procedures. The exclusion restriction also requires that differences in the winning margins
for each seat have no direct effect on the outcome of interest. We see this as justifiable as
we find that almost all slim-majorities have some seats that were themselves the result of
close district-level races.
Implementing the method suggested by Cattaneo, Frandsen, and Titiunik 2015, we find
1See Cattaneo, Titiunik, and Vazquez-Bare 2017 for a method to relax this assumption.
2These posts come with clear powers: agenda, committee appointments, and resources
(Clucas 2001).
4that windows around the cut-off of two seats or one percent of seats in state Houses have
enough observations and achieve balance of predetermined covariates. This indicates that
RDD estimates within these windows can be interpreted as local randomized experiments.
However, slim-majorities in state Senates cannot be interpreted as local randomized
experiments, as the balance of predetermined variables is not achieved for any window.
We go beyond Cattaneo, Frandsen, and Titiunik 2015 and propose a further test. We
verify whether slim-majorities had enough state-district races that were themselves close
and won by the majority party. For example, we determine that within our sample all
state Houses with slim-majorities of one seat resulted from elections with at least one
close state-district race won by the majority party. In other words, there is no evidence to
suggest that one-seat slim-majorities could have been predetermined or manipulated.
The closest paper to ours is Feigenbaum, Fouirnaies, and Hall 2017. They propose a
continuity-based multidimensional RDD using district-level voting in order to address
the lack of continuity in the number of seats in the US state Houses (they do not apply
their method to the Senates). Their method requires the choice of a metric to build a
one-dimensional running variable from a series of state-district race results. With infinite
metrics to validate, their method would – at the limit – be a matching estimator and no
longer a design-based approach (Feigenbaum, Fouirnaies, and Hall 2017, p.18). Here,
instead, we employ the number of seats directly as the running variable. Thus, the method
presented here – if valid – is more straightforward to apply. Moreover, our approach does
not require the availability of lower-level electoral data. If lower-level data is available or
partially available, as in our case, the test proposed here can be implemented.
Another stance would be to define an aggregate measure of the results in district-level
races as an alternative running variable that is measured with error. In this alternative
setting, an election could yield a slim-majority without this running variable being close to
5the cut-off or vice versa.3 Our approach is different. We assume that the running variable
is the number (or percentage) of seats and that it is measured without error. We identify
our effect by comparing slim-majorities within a precise window. Any observation that
does not fall within the determined widow is excluded from the analysis, whether or not it
could have been classified as ‘close to the cut-off’ with an alternative running variable
based on the aggregation of district-level races.
As an illustration, we use the method proposed here to estimate the effects of partisan
control of the state Houses on electoral outcomes. Formally, our RDD parameter of interest
is E[Yi(1)|Xi = 1] − E[Yi(0)|Xi = −1], where Yi(1) is the outcome in t + 1 given that party
i won a slim-majority in t of one seat, Xi = 1; and Yi(0) is the outcome in t + 1 given
that party i won a slim minority in t of one seat, Xi = −1. This parameter is identifiable
under the assumptions described above (see also Cattaneo, Idrobo, and Titiunik 2019).
In practice, we determine in the following whether we can compare slim-majorities and
minorities of only one seat or whether we must increase the interval to more seats.
Our estimates suggest there is no causal effect of winning a slim-majority in the state
House on: i) winning another majority in the subsequent election, ii) influencing the
election for Governor, or iii) influencing the majority in the state Senate.4
Validity of RDD with slim-majorities
The available data is comprised of that from the 48 continental American states from 1960
to 2006 and is the same as Besley and Case 2003. We have updated their sample from
3One could produce valid estimates in such a setup with methods described in Pei and
Shen 2017.
4In the on-line Appendix we also show null effects on the state tax level, and
unemployment.
61960 to 1998 with data from 1999 to 2006.5 To keep the sample comparable, we focus the
analysis on the states with the most common set of institutions: a partisan two-chamber
legislature and a governor with line-item veto power. The working sample has 41 states
from 1960 to 2006. Each observation is a state-election-year.
We also have data on state electoral returns at the district-level spanning 1967 to 2003
(Carsey et al. 2008). There are an approximate 18% missing values for the variable that we
are interested in: the margin of victory, defined as the difference between the percentage of
votes that the winner received and the percentage of votes that the second-place candidate
received in each state district.
For clarity, we reserve the word ‘election’ for the state-wide poll that determines how
many seats each party will hold in the state legislature. We reserve the word ‘race’ for
a state-district-specific poll that determines the partisan identity of each state-district’s
representative.
Slim-majorities and close state-district races
Each US state is divided into state-districts. During an election, each state-district chooses
a representative to the state legislature by a first-past-the-post system.6 If each of these
state-district races were the result of large and predictable winning margins, then there
would be no uncertainty regarding which party would win the majority of seats in each
election. A slim-majority of one seat would be as predictable and predetermined as a
landslide majority of 20 seats. Therefore, the first test we propose in order to establish that
5Sources: Census Bureau, state legislature websites, the website for the National
Association of State Budget Offices (NASBO), and the website for the National Conference
of State Legislatures (NCSL)
6A small minority has free-for-all multi-member districts. These are excluded.
7slim-majorities can be interpreted as local randomized experiments is to establish that
enough state-district seats were themselves the result of close races that were won by the
same party that won the majority of seats.
In Table 1, we present the data in the form of different windows around the cut-off of
our running variable,Democratic majority. The variable takes a value of 1 if the Democrats
hold a majority of one seat, 2 if there is a two-seat majority, -1 if the Republicans hold a
majority of one seat, -2 if the Republican majority is of two seats, and so on. The cut-off
is 0. Democratic majority also takes the value 0 if there is a tie (some legislatures have
an even number of seats). In row 1, column 2, we can see that there are 10 elections for
state Houses that have ties (i.e., both Republicans and Democrats hold the same number
of seats) or slim-majorities of one seat. In row 1, column 3, we can see that all (i.e, 100%)
of these 10 elections had at least one state-district race won by the majority party with
a winning margin of less than 5% of the district vote, our chosen threshold for a close
election.7 This suggests that all majorities of one seat were neither predetermined nor
predictable. Had that one seat gone to the other party, the partisan identity of the majority
in the House would have changed.
As we descend through Table 1, we increase the size of the window around the cut-off.
Row 2 shows that out of 20 observations (i.e., state-years) with slim-majorities of two
seats or less, 19 (i.e., 95%) had at least two state-district races won by the majority party
that were close (the remaining observation only had one district race won by the majority
party that was close). Ill-health, scandal, or the weather, for example, could also change
the result of a particular seat in unpredictable ways and still deliver a winning margin
7One potential interpretation of this threshold is that 5% is the margin of errors of
surveys of 1,000 respondents. This suggests that even if there were district-specific polls,
it would be difficult to predict the result of each race.
8table 1 Percentage of slim-majorities that could not be predicted
Democratic majority Number of Percentage with enough
observations close district races
(state-years) (less than 5% of district vote)
State House
Number of seats
-1,1 10 100
-2,2 20 95
-3,3 34 79
-4,4 23 78
-5,5 60 78
Percentage of seats
-1,1 18 83
-2,2 40 62
-3,3 61 54
-4,4 84 49
-5,5 96 43
State Senate
Number of seats
-1,1 41 53
-2,2 69 46
-3,3 98 43
-4,4 83 45
-5,5 164 38
Percentage of seats
-1,1 18 83
-2,2 43 84
-3,3 67 57
-4,4 83 37
-5,5 115 31
Note: The first column indicates the size of a window around the cut-off
Democratic majority = 0. The second column reports the number of observations
in each widow for which we have state-district electoral data. The third column reports the
percentage of state-district races in each window that were close wins for the majority party. The
data on election results by state district has been provided by Carsey et al. 2008.
9above 5% of the vote-share. For that reason, we see the rate of 95% in row 2, column 3,
as indicating that the -2,2 window should not be rejected as a potential window within
which we can interpret the results as a local randomized experiment. As the window
size increases to the -5,5 window, the percentage of close state-district races won by the
majority party approaches 80%.
We now pursue the same exercise, but instead look at the percentage of seats as the
running variable (rows 6 to 10 in Table 1). There are 18 slim-majorities of 1% of seats
or less; 83% of them have at least 1% of close state-district races that were won by the
majority party. As mentioned in the previous paragraph, the result in individual seats can
be unpredictable and still deliver winning margins above 5%. For this reason, we see a
rate above 80% as an indication that these slim-majorities were neither predetermined nor
predictable. As the window size increases in rows 7 to 10, the percentage of slim-majorities
that had enough state-district close races won by the majority party decreases to 62%
for the -2%,2% window and to approximately 50% for larger windows. Overall this
indicates that windows other than the -1%,1% interval are not valid as a local randomized
experiment.
From rows 11 on-wards in Table 1, we follow the same procedure as before for the
state Senates. In all five windows in which the number of seats is the running variable,
approximately half of slim-majorities in the state Senates are the result of elections in
which none of the state-district races won by the majority party were close. This suggests
that even the smallest window of -1,1 seats cannot be interpreted as a local randomized
experiment. Utilizing the percentage of seats, both the -1%,1% and the -2%,2% interval
have more than 80% of slim-majorities with enough close state-district races that were
won by the majority party. Therefore, we do not reject that these two windows could be
interpreted as local randomized experiments.
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Determining the windows for local randomization
In this section, we follow the practical steps suggested by Cattaneo, Frandsen, and Titiunik
2015 to establish whether local randomization is plausible in small windows around
the cut-off and determine the size of such a window. The procedure involves a simple
difference-in-means test for the predetermined covariates comparing their values on each
side of the cut-off. This test is carried out for each candidate window. If the p-value
regarding the null that a covariate has the same value for both sides of the cut-off is below
0.15 (as suggested by Cattaneo, Frandsen, and Titiunik 2015), then that window is rejected
and we attempt the procedure with a smaller window. A window is selected if one cannot
reject the null for any of the predetermined covariates using a threshold p-value of 0.15.
As suggested by Cattaneo, Frandsen, and Titiunik 2015, we only consider windows with at
least 10 observations on each side of the cut-off.
The implementation of this method for the US legislatures can be seen in Table 2.
In column 1, we list different windows around the cut-off, Democratic Ma jority = 0.8
In column 2, we list the number of observations (i.e., of state-years) on either side of
the cut-off. In column 3, we list the lowest p-value from the balance test for a series of
predetermined covariates. In column 4, we list the covariate with the lowest p-value.9
The electoral covariates that we test for balance are the following: Dem Majority
Senate, an indicator variable that takes a value of 1 if the Democrats gain control of the
8 We exclude observations in which the state House had a tie between Republicans and
Democrats (seven observations). Treatment cannot be defined in these cases. We only
exclude ties in the Senate from states that did not have the post of Lieutenant Governor
(four exclusions). Lieutenant Governors supply the deciding vote in case of a tie.
9We use large sample inference to calculate the p-values in the paper. In the on-line
Appendix we show that finite sample inference would not alter our results.
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table 2 Minimum p-value of predetermined covariates for different intervals
Democratic majority n. obs Min. p-value Covariate
State House
Number of seats
-2,2 14/12 0.27 Dem Majority Senate
-3,3 25/18 0.20 State Taxes (%GDP)
-4,4 34/26 0.25 Dem Governor
-5,5 43/37 0.13 Dem Majority Senate
Percentage of seats
-1,1 12/11 0.23 Dem Majority Senate t − 1
-2,2 25/27 0.15 State taxes (%GDP)
-3,3 37/42 0.13 Midterm Election
-4,4 63/55 0.02 Dem Majority House t − 1
-5,5 72/65 0.00 Dem Majority House t − 1
State Senate
Number of seats
-1,1 27/23 0.07 Dem Governor
-2,2 53/36 0.00 Dem Majority Senate t − 1
-3,3 69/57 0.00 Dem Majority Senate t − 1
-4,4 90/75 0.00 Dem Majority Senate t − 1
-5,5 108/101 0.00 Dem Majority Senate t − 1
Percentage of seats
-1,1 6/14 0.01 Dem Majority Senate t − 1
-2,2 21/27 0.05 Dem Governor
-3,3 46/39 0.00 Dem Majority Senate t − 1
-4,4 60/44 0.00 Dem Majority Senate t − 1
-5,5 80/65 0.00 Dem Majority Senate t − 1
Note: The first column indicates the size of the window around the cut-offDemocratic majority= 0.
The second column reports the number of observations on each side of the cut-off within a
widow. The third column reports the lowest p-value of a balance test for a series of covariates
using large-sample inference. Column four reports the covariate with the lowest p-value.
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state Senate in the current election; Dem Majority Senate in t − 1; Dem Majority House,
an indicator variable that takes a value of 1 if the Democrats gain control of the state
House at the current election; Dem Majority House in t − 1; Dem Governor, an indicator
variable that takes a value of 1 if the governor is a Democrat during the current election
or wins the current election; Dem Governor in t − 1, i.e., the election result two or four
years previous depending on the electoral cycle. The economic covariates that we test
for balance are: State real income per capita in 1982 US$; unemployment rate; local
property taxes (%GDP); and state tax level (%GDP). We also treat the year of the election
as a covariate.
The -2,2 window does lend itself to be interpreted as a local randomized experiment
(Table 2, row 1). There are more than 10 observations on each side of the cut-off and the
predetermined covariate with the highest p-value is Dem Majority Senate with a p-value of
0.27, above the 0.15 rejection threshold. Note that the number of observations is similar
on either side of the cut-off, also a condition for the validity of RDD. Finally, from Table 1,
we know that more than 90% of the observations in this interval are slim-majorities with
at least two close state-district races won by the majority. Windows -3,3 and -4,4 seem
valid as local randomized experiments (Table 2, rows 2 to 4) as all covariates are balanced.
The -5,5 window, however, is rejected as a local randomized experiment. The reason we
do not have a row entry for the -1,1 window is because the number of observations on
either side of the cut-off, 4 and 7, is too low for inference.
The same exercise is repeated for the percentage of seats in the House as the running
variables (rows 5 to 9 in Table 2). Only the -1%,1% window cannot be rejected as a local
randomized experiment.
Slim-majorities in the state Senate cannot be interpreted as local randomized experi-
ments. This can be seen in the remaining rows of Table 2. For every window, there is at
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least one covariate for which the balance test is rejected with a p-value below 0.15.10
Continuity-based RDD
The number of seats is a discrete running variable with mass points at the integers as can
be seen in Figure 1a and 1c. If the running variable is defined as the percentage of seats,
however, it is not obvious a priori that such a variable would have mass points.
In Figure 1bwe plot the number of observations at each value of the variableDemocratic
majority in the Senate measured as the percentage of seats. There is a clear mass point in
the proximity of -1% (five observations) and of 1% (four observations); an empty interval
in the proximity of 0 and a mass point at 0 (16 observations). Hence, the assumption of
continuity of the running variable does not hold and the “continuity-based” RDD setup
should not be implemented for the state Senates.
In Figure 1d, it is less clear whether we should reject the assumption of continuity
for the variable, Democratic Majority, measured as the percentage of seats in the House -
as there are fewer mass points. In particular, owning to some of the Houses having high
numbers of representatives, the variable reaches the value -0.2% from the left and 0.2%
from the right.
Suppose we were to assume continuity for the running variables in the Senate and
House, number of seats, and percentages. Usual practice would dictate we decide on the
validity of the regression discontinuity design by analyzing Table 3. In this table, we test
the balance of covariates via a local linear regression with a triangular kernel, the optimal
10In the on-line Appendix we apply the Kolmogorov-Smirnov(KS) test for equality of
distributions instead of the t-test used in Table 2. Qualitatively the results are similar. The
main difference is that the KS test suggests that the -1,1 window for the Senate is also
valid for local randomization.
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Figure 1. Number observations at each value of Democratic majority
(a) Senate - number of seats (b) Senate - percentage of seats
(c) House - number of seats (d) House - percentage of seats
Note: Democratic majority is the running variable presented on the horizontal axis. Positive
values imply a Democratic majority and negative values a Republican majority. In each figure,
the caption indicates an alternative definition of the running variable: Senate, House, number of
seats, and percentage of seats. The number of observations for each value of the running variable
is shown on the horizontal axis.
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bandwidth suggested in Imbens and Kalyanaraman 2012, and p-values as suggested in
Calonico, Cattaneo, and Titiunik 2014. The lack of any statistically significant jump at the
cut-off would suggest we maintain the assumption of continuity of the potential outcome
functions at the cut-off. These results, in addition to the lack of a jump in the density as
measured by the McCrary 2008 test in the last two rows, would suggest we maintain the
assumption of continuity of all variants of the running variable.
table 3 Balance Test for Covariates and Democratic Majority - CCT Robust
Variable Test Diff=0 p-value
House Senate
Numbers Percentage Numbers Percentage
Dem Majority Senate 0.60 0.85 - -
Dem Majority Senate t − 1 0.68 0.62 0.35 0.12
Dem Majority House - - 0.62 0.94
Dem Majority House t − 1 0.51 0.76 0.61 0.60
Dem Governor 0.64 0.92 0.38 0.16
Dem Governor t − 1 0.44 0.67 0.92 0.85
Midterm Election 0.33 0.42 0.90 0.87
Income per capita 0.97 0.36 0.37 0.73
Local Property Taxes 0.95 0.36 0.20 0.09
State Tax Level (%GDP) 0.48 0.49 0.80 0.86
Unemployment Rate 0.70 0.70 0.57 0.61
Year 0.69 0.19 0.56 0.91
McCrary density test estimate -0.19 -0.22 -0.21 -0.20
standard errors (0.13) (0.23) (0.16) (0.21)
Note: The first column reports the predetermined covariates. Columns 2 to 5 present the p-value
for the balance test for different running variables. Local linear estimates and bandwidth tests
are implemented as suggested by Imbens and Kalyanaraman 2012 and p-values as suggested in
Calonico, Cattaneo, and Titiunik 2014. Density test as suggested in McCrary 2008.
We would then, go on naively to implement the canonical “continuity-based” RDD for
running variables that we have shown to be discrete and with clear mass points. Therefore,
any result obtained would be hard to interpret or wrong. The potential exception is the
results for the Democratic Majority in the House measured as a percentage of seats - as it
is not clear from Figure 1d that we should reject the assumption of continuity regarding
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this running variable.
Electoral outcomes in the state Houses under local randomization
We present results for the smallest window deemed valid as a local randomized experiment
for both the number of seats and percentage of seats, respectively -2,2 and -1%,1%. Sample
sizes are low, but we show in the on-line Appendix that the results are robust to larger
windows with larger sample sizes. We also estimate the canonical continuity-based RDD
with the running variable Democratic Majority in the House measured as the percentage
of seats.
First, we check whether winning a slim-majority today increases the chance that the
party wins a majority in the next election (Table 4, rows 1, 2, and 3). The outcome variable
Dem House in t+1 takes a value of 1 if Democrats gain control of the state House in
the next election. None of the estimated jumps is statistically different from zero. The
point estimates are themselves near zero. This result is in line with what Feigenbaum,
Fouirnaies, and Hall 2017 have estimated using a multidimensional RDD.
We depart from Feigenbaum, Fouirnaies, and Hall 2017 as the null effect we estimate
is persistent over time (see the on-line Appendix). One potential reason for our results
differing may be that their method makes use of more information, i.e., the race result of
each individual district. Another potential reason may be that their downstream result is
dependent on the particular metric chosen to construct their aggregating running variable.
Another individual electoral outcome that has been studied through RDD and close
elections is coat-tail effects. Broockman 2009 finds that congressional incumbency has no
impact on presidential electoral results. The parallel slim-majority effect would be for a
slim democratic majority in the House to affect the odds of the Democrats becoming the
17
table 4 Randomization-based estimation of slim-majority effects in state Houses
Running variable Outcome variable
Democratic majority Democratic House in t + 1
Jump at cut-off Test Diff=0 Sample size
Window Point estimate p-value Dem. Rep.
-2,2 (number of seats) -0.11 0.58 12 13
-1,1 (% of seats) 0.14 0.53 10 11
CCT-robust (% of seats) -0.06 0.53 132 145
Democratic majority Democratic Senate in t + 1
Jump at cut-off Test Diff=0 Sample size
Window Point estimate p-value Dem. Rep.
-2,2 (number of seats) 0.04 0.85 12 13
-1,1 (% of seats) 0.02 0.92 10 11
CCT-robust (% of seats) 0.02 0.99 199 157
Democratic majority Democratic Governor in t + 1
Jump at cut-off Test Diff=0 Sample size
Window Point estimate p-value Dem. Rep.
-2,2 (number of seats) -0.06 0.76 12 13
-1,1 (% of seats) 0.22 0.30 10 11
CCT-robust (% of seats) 0.08 0.55 129 120
Note: Local linear estimates and bandwidth tests are implemented as suggested by Imbens and
Kalyanaraman 2012 and p-values as suggested in Calonico, Cattaneo, and Titiunik 2014. Local
randomization windows chosen according to Cattaneo, Frandsen, and Titiunik 2015 and p-values
calculated using large-sample inference.
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majority in the Senate or winning the governorship in the following election. We also find
a null effect in both cases (Table 4, rows 4 to 9).
Further, in the on-line Appendix we explore the effect of partisan control on the tax
level and unemployment and find null effects as well.
Concluding remarks
Our result indicating that slim-majorities in the state Senates are not valid for RDD may
have been expected. The average Senate has 39 seats and one-third of the seats are
contested in each election. The probability of at least one of them being a close race is
small compared to the average House that has 100 seats contested in each election. We
contribute by establishing that indeed there are not enough close races in Senate elections
to warrant an RDD. Even if we were to ignore the lack of close races (they could have been
unpredictable even if not close), we show that slim-majorities in the state Senates do not
satisfy the conditions to be interpreted as local-randomized experiments. These results are
important because under the erroneous assumption that the running variable is continuous,
the usual balance tests would fail to reject the validity of Senate slim-majorities as RDDs.
Slim-majorities in the state Houses, on the other hand, seem to be valid under the
local randomization assumption. If the running variable is the number of seats, the clear
presence of mass points implies that the we should not use RDD methods that are based on
the continuity of the running variable. However, if the running variable is the percentage of
seats, it is not clear that we should reject the assumption of a continuous running variable.
In practice, we show that results using the “continuity-based” canonical RD setup with
percentage of seats as the running variable yields similar results to the local-randomization
methods. Therefore, following Cattaneo, Titiunik, and Vazquez-Bare 2017 we suggest
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that results under both assumptions be shown in order to check for robustness. Further, if
available or partially available, information on the underlying vote share should be used as
a falsification analysis in the form of the test depicted in Table 1. The application of these
methods contributes to the literature by allowing a series of questions on slim-majority
effects to be addressed with an easily-implementable design-based method.
A remaining concern is that such a design may be unable to capture partisan effects
even if there was one. This could be based on power concerns, for example. In the
on-line Appendix, we show that the RDD method described in this paper does capture
a statistically significant effect: a unified government - defined as the state House and
Governor belonging to the same party - has a higher tax level than a divided government.
This result is a re-estimation of the effect described in De Magalhães and Ferrero 2015
using the methods discussed herein.
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